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Abstract
Southeast Iraq has witnessed consid-
erable protest violence in recent years. 
Yet the nature of this violence, and its 
effects in shaping protest dynamics, have 
varied considerably between provinces, 
and when comparing different phases of 
mobilisation over time. Consequently, 
frequently cited macro-level factors 
(e.g., a breakdown in the elite-citizen 
social contract, uneven socio-economic 
development, poor public services, wide-
spread corruption etc.) provide only a 
partial explanation of violent dynamics 
and cannot account for temporal and 
geographic disparities. By contrast, this 
paper presents a granular and ground-
level view of protest violence by drawing 
on a combination of protest event anal-
ysis and interview data. This is used to 
show how broader structural conditions 
and national-level politics intersect with 
more localised structures to produce 
distinct social logics that govern the 
application of protest violence, and its 
effects, in specific localities. The paper’s 
key finding is that effective interven-
tion to alter violent dynamics around 
protests in Iraq depends on access to 
local and diffuse forms of power. Con-
sequently, it is only elite political actors 
with reach into these local domains who 
regulate violent dynamics. 
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Executive Summary
Since the chaotic demonstrations in Basra during the summer of 2018, protesting in Iraq 
has become increasingly dangerous and fraught with violence. The southeast – and par-
ticularly protest hubs in Basra and Dhi Qar – has witnessed some of the highest levels of 
protest violence. Yet the nature of this violence, and its effects in shaping protest dynam-
ics, have varied considerably from province to province, and when comparing different 
phases of mobilisation over time. Consequently, frequently cited macro-level factors (e.g., 
a breakdown in the elite-citizen social contract, uneven socio-economic development, 
poor public services, widespread corruption etc.) provide only a partial explanation of 
violent dynamics and cannot account for temporal and geographic disparities.
By contrast, this paper takes a granular and ground-level view of protest violence by drawing 
on a unique database of several thousand incidents of protest and protest-related violence 
and combining this data with targeted interviews with activists and informed observers. It 
identifies the local factors that shape violent dynamics, including the socio-demographic 
composition and organisation of protest groups, the interconnected networks of influence 
that span political, paramilitary and security structures, the varying salience of potentially 
ameliorative social formations (e.g. tribal), among others. Ultimately, the paper explains 
how these local structures interact and intersect with broader structural conditions and 
national-level politics to produce distinct social logics that govern the application of 
protest violence and its effects in specific localities. 
A key finding of the paper is that the diffusion of power within these local structures 
favours political actors who not only traverse the theoretical boundaries between the Iraqi 
state and civil society, but also mediate the distance between the complex social forma-
tions of power at a provincial, district, or neighbourhood level, and the domain of elite 
politics. Consequently, when it comes to regulating protest violence, so-called control 
processes1 circulate locally, and those actors able to close the gap between command and 
control and local social logics of violence are best situated to influence dynamics. 
The empirical cases discussed in this paper clarify this distinction. Despite analyses 
focusing on Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s efforts to rein in anti-protest violence 
via a continuous cycle of appointments across elite security sector positions – at both 
national and provincial level – the data presented here does not provide evidence that 
this impacted violent dynamics around protests. The key reason for this is the PM’s lack of 
power where it really matters – where control processes circulate locally. Indeed, in some 
1  This draws on the concept as used by Stanliand, which is interpreted here as referring to those social 
institutions, formations and processes that transmit and mediate authority and thus structure how stra-
tegic control translates into action within a given locality. For more, see Paul Staniland, Networks of 
Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse (New York: Cornell University Press, 2014).
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cases, Kadhimi opted to appoint security leaders who lacked local ties, hoping this would 
increase their autonomy and reliability vis-a-vis central control. However, this can hinder 
rather than help the PM to extend his own authority into local power bases.2
By contrast, a group like the Sadrists has proven more effective at regulating protest 
violence in the southeast. This is not merely a function of coercive capacity, but, more 
importantly, of the movement’s diffuse power at the local level. Moreover, the mediation 
of this local power with the Sadrist leadership typically functions through highly personal 
ties at only one or two steps removed, that is, through a personal mode of representa-
tion at the provincial level that functions as a ‘floating broker’ capacity knitting together 
diverse forms of coercive, political, economic, social and religious power.3 
Consequently, from a policy perspective, the expectation that reform – and particularly 
progress towards accountability for anti-protest violence – is a process running criti-
cally through the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and its struggle for influence over Iraq’s 
security apparatus has been misplaced. This has been most apparent in the disjuncture 
between the fervent debates that surround each attempt by the PM and Iraqi authorities 
to arrest militiamen responsible for killing protesters, and the comparative silence vis-
à-vis the more salient fact that the Kadhimi administration (and the political survival of 
Kadhimi himself) has to an extent fallen hostage to the power of the most effective, and 
frequently violent, counter-protest actor in Iraq, namely the Sadrist movement.4 This dis-
juncture would appear to reflect a misdiagnosis of power – where it lies, how it operates, 
who can wield it – that is unlikely to provide a sound basis for strategic thinking aimed at 
mapping Iraq’s pathway out of destabilising protest violence and repression.
2  One recent example of this dilemma was the 12 May 2021 attempted arrest in Basra of Asaʾib Ahl 
al-Haq (AAH) member Sabah al-Wafi (head of AAH’s Basra economic committee) by a Falcons Cell unit 
sent from Baghdad. The arrest resulted in AAH militiamen mobilising and attacking the Basra Falcons 
Cell offices in Basra’s Presidential Palaces Compound with small arms fire. The escalation was defused 
by the intervention of Basra Operations Command (BaOC) CG Maj. Gen. Akram Saddam Midnef who 
effectively transferred the ISF-militia armed encounter into a tribal dispute resolved via an atwa (tribal 
truce), ultimately resulting in the failure of the arrest mission. For this reason, the PM sacked Midnef 
and replaced him with Maj. Gen. Ali al-Majidi. Majidi’s lack of profile in Basra, and supposed inde-
pendence from the province’s local power bases, was likely a factor in Kadhimi’s decision to appoint 
him. However, it remains highly unlikely that under the same circumstances faced by Midnef on 12 
May, Majidi would risk an escalation of an armed dispute between ISF and PMF or militiamen in Basra, 
meaning that recourse to local mediating structures (e.g., tribal) would still be necessary. 
3  Muqtada al-Sadr’s current personal representative in Basra is the cleric Hazem al-Araji.
4  This is based on both empirical observation of the Sadrist movement’s use of intimidation and vio-
lence at critical junctures to supress the October Movement, as well as interviews and discussions with 
activists themselves who frequently cited the Sadrists as being the most effective counter-protest force.
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الملخص التنفيذي 
بالعنف.  ومحفوفاً  العراق خطرياً  االحتجاج يف  أصبح  البرصة خالل صيف 2018،  الفوضوية يف  املظاهرات  اندالع  منذ 
شهد الجنوب الرشقي - وخاصة بؤر االحتجاج يف البرصة وذي قار - بعض أعىل مستويات العنف يف االحتجاجات. ومع 
ذلك  فإن طبيعة هذا العنف و تأثريه عىل تشكيل ديناميكيات االحتجاج ، قد اختلفت بشكل كبري من محافظة إىل 
أخرى، وكذلك عند مقارنة مراحل التعبئة املختلفة مبرور الوقت. و بناء عىل ذلك، فإن العوامل عىل املستوى الكيل التي 
يتم االستشهاد بها بشكل متكرر )عىل سبيل املثال :انهيار العقد االجتامعي بني النخبة واملواطنني، و التنمية االجتامعية 
لديناميكيات  جزئياً  تفسرياً  فقط  تقدم  ...الخ(  املسترشي  والفساد  العامة،  الخدمات  وسوء  املتكافئة،  غري  واالقتصادية 
العنف وال ميكنها أن تفرس التفاوتات الزمنية و الجغرافية.
وعىل النقيض من ذلك ،تقدم هذه الورقة نظرة دقيقة عىل الصعيد امليداين للعنف يف االحتجاجات من خالل االعتامد 
عىل قاعدة بيانات فريدة من عدة آالف حالة من االحتجاجات و من حوادث العنف املرتبطة باالحتجاجات ،و تجمع 
هذه البيانات مع مقابالت مستهدفة مع النشطاء واملراقبني املطلعني .وتحدد هذه الورقة العوامل املحلية التي تشكل 
ديناميكيات العنف ،مبا يف ذلك التكوين االجتامعي والدميوغرايف وتنظيم مجموعات االحتجاج ،وشبكات التأثري املرتابطة 
التي متتد عرب البنى السياسية وشبه العسكرية واألمنية ،والظهور املتفاوت لتشكيالت إجتامعية مُحسّنة محتملة( عىل 
سبيل املثال :القبلية ،)من بني أمور أخرى .أخريا ،ًترشح هذه الورقة كيف تتفاعل هذه البنى املحلية وتتقاطع مع الظروف 
البنيوية األوسع والسياسات عىل املستوى الوطني إلنتاج منطق اجتامعي متميز يحكم تطبيق العنف االحتجاجي وتأثرياته 
يف مناطق محددة.
و من أحد النتائج الرئيسية لهذه الورقة ، أن انتشار السلطة داخل هذه البنى املحلية يُفضل األطراف السياسية الذين 
ال يجتازون الحدود النظرية بني الدولة العراقية واملجتمع املدين ،بل و أيضا ًيتوسطون املسافة بني التشكيالت االجتامعية 
املعقدة للسلطة ،يف املحافظة و املنطقة أوحتى عىل مستوى الحي ،ومجال السياسة النخبوية .و لذلك عندما يتعلق األمر 
بتنظيم العنف يف االحتجاجات ،فإن ما يسمى بعمليات التحكم5 تنترش محليا ،ًوتكون األطراف السياسية القادرة عىل سد 
الفجوة بني القيادة والسيطرة واملنطق االجتامعي املحيل للعنف هي األفضل للتأثري عىل الديناميكيات.
توضح الحاالت العملية التي نوقشت يف هذه الورقة هذا التباين .عىل الرغم من التحليالت التي تركز عىل جهود رئيس 
الوزراء مصطفى الكاظمي لكبح جامح العنف ضد االحتجاجات من خالل سلسلة مستمرة من التعيينات ملناصب 
النخبة يف قطاع األمن - عىل املستويني الوطني واإلقليمي - فإن البيانات املقدمة هنا ال تقدم دليال ًعىل أن هذا أثر عىل 
ديناميكيات العنف فيام يتعلق باالحتجاجات .والسبب الرئييس لذلك هو افتقار رئيس الوزراء للسلطة عندما يتعلق يف 
األمور الهامة  أي مكان انتشار إجراءات التحكم محليا .يًف الواقع و يف بعض الحاالت ،اختار الكاظمي تعيني قادة أمنيني 
يفتقرون إىل وجود الروابط املحلية ،عىل أمل أن يؤدي ذلك إىل زيادة استقالليتهم و مصداقيتهم مقابل السيطرة املركزية. 
5   يعتمد هذا عىل املفهوم الذي استخدمه ستانلياند، والذي يتم تفسريه هنا عىل أنه يشري إىل تلك املؤسسات والتشكيالت والعمليات 
معينة.للمزيد،  منطقة  ضمن  فعل  اىل  يرتجم  االسرتاتيجي  التحكم  كيف  تنظيم  وبالتايل  وتتوسطها،  السلطة  تنقل  التي  االجتامعية 
Paul Staniland, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse (New York: Cornell University Press, 2014(.
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ومع ذلك ،ميكن أن يعيق هذا رئيس الوزراء بدال ًمن مساعدته يف بسط سلطته إىل قواعد السلطة املحلية.6
و عىل النقيض من ذلك ،أثبتت جامعة مثل الصدريني أنها أكرث فاعلية يف تنظيم العنف يف االحتجاجات يف الجنوب 
الرشقي .هذا ليس مجرد دور للقدرة القرسية ،ولكن األهم من ذلك ،لقوة التيار املنترشة عىل املستوى املحيل .و باإلضافة 
اىل ذلك ،فإن وساطة هذه القوة املحلية مع القيادة الصدرية تعمل عادة من خالل عالقات شخصية للغاية بعيدة لدرجة 
أو درجتني فقط ،أي من خالل وضع التمثيل الشخيص عىل مستوى املحافظات و الذي يعمل مبثابة “ وسيط عائم ’‘ يجمع 
بني أشكال متنوعة من القوة القرسية والسياسية واالقتصادية واالجتامعية والدينية.7
وبالتايل ،من منظور السياسة ،فإن توقع أن اإلصالح - وخاصة التقدم نحو املساءلة عن العنف ضد االحتجاج - هو عملية 
تجري بشكل حاسم من خالل مكتب رئيس الوزراء )PMO( ورصاعه من أجل النفوذ عىل جهاز األمن يف العراق كان 
يف غري محله .كان هذا واضحا يًف االنفصال بني النقاشات املحتدمة التي أحاطت بكل محاولة من قبل رئيس الوزراء 
والسلطات العراقية العتقال رجال امليليشيات املسؤولني عن قتل املتظاهرين ،والصمت النسبي تجاه الحقيقة األكرث 
بروزا ًوهي أن إدارة الكاظمي ،و البقاء السيايس للكاظمي نفسه ،قد وقع إىل حد ما رهينة لسلطة  األكرث فاعلية و عنفاً 
و ممثل االحتجاج املضاد يف العراق ،وهو التيار الصدري.8 يبدو أن هذا االنفصال يعكس تشخيصا ًخاطئا ًللسلطة - أين 
تكمن ،وكيف تعمل ،ومن ميكنه استخدامها - من غري املرجح أن يوفر أساسا ًسليام  ًللتفكري االسرتاتيجي الذي يهدف إىل 
رسم مسار للعراق للخروج من عنف االحتجاجات و والقمع املزعزع لالستقرار.
6   أحد األمثلة الحديثة عىل هذه املعضلة كان محاولة اعتقال عضو عصائب أهل الحق  صباح الوايف )رئيس اللجنة االقتصادية يف 
البرصة( يف البرصة يف 12 مايو / أيار 2021 من قبل خلية الصقور املرسلة من بغداد. نتج عن االعتقال قيام ميليشيات عصائب أهل 
الحق بتعبئة ومهاجمة مكاتب خلية صقور البرصة يف مجمع القصور الرئاسية بالبرصة باألسلحة الخفيفة. تم نزع فتيل التصعيد بتدخل 
قائد عمليات البرصة )BaOC( اللواء أكرم صدام مدنيف، الذي حّول املواجهة املسلحة بني قوات األمن العراقية وميليشيا قوات األمن 
العراقية إىل نزاع قبيل تم حله عن طريق العطوة )الهدنة القبلية(، مام أدى يف النهاية إىل فشل مهمة االعتقال. لهذا السبب، أقال رئيس 
الوزراء مدنف واستبدله باللواء عيل املجيدي. من املحتمل أن عدم لفت األنظار اىل املجيدي يف البرصة، واالستقالل املفرتض عن قواعد 
السلطة املحلية يف املحافظة، كانا سببان يف قرار الكاظمي بتعيينه. ومع ذلك، ال يزال من غري املحتمل للغاية يف ظل الظروف نفسها التي 
واجهها مدنيف يف 12 مايو/أيار، أن يخاطر املجيدي بتصعيد النزاع املسلح بني قوى األمن الداخيل وقوات الحشد الشعبي أو امليليشيات 
يف البرصة، مام يعني أن اللجوء إىل بنى الوساطة املحلية )عىل سبيل املثال: القبلية( سيبقى رضورياً.
7   املمثل الشخيص الحايل ملقتدى الصدر يف البرصة هو رجل الدين حازم األعرجي.
8   يستند هذا إىل كل من املالحظة الواقعية الستخدام التيار الصدري للرتهيب والعنف يف منعطفات حاسمة لقمع حركة أكتوبر/ترشين 
األول، باإلضافة إىل املقابالت واملناقشات مع النشطاء أنفسهم الذين قاموا باالستشهاد بالصدريني يف كثري من األحيان عىل أنهم أقوى 
قوة لالحتجاج املضاد.
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Introduction
Since the demonstrations in Basra during the summer of 2018, protesting in Iraq has become 
increasingly dangerous as activists and civil society organisers are routinely subjected to 
both indiscriminate and highly targeted violence from state and parastatal armed groups. At 
the same time, protester-directed violence has also become a major political phenomenon 
with some protest groups engaging in mass-scale property destruction and clashes with 
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Overall, the violence surrounding protests in Iraq can now cred-
ibly be considered as amongst the most extreme in the world. This paper seeks to explain 
this remarkable expansion of violence and to identify its effects on protest dynamics.
Within Iraq, the southeast – and particularly protest hubs in Basra and Dhi Qar – has 
witnessed some of the highest levels of protest violence in recent years, while also exhib-
iting distinct dynamics vis-à-vis other parts of the country. In fact, violent dynamics vary 
considerably from province to province, and when comparing different phases of mobi-
lisation over time. Consequently, frequently cited macro-level factors (e.g., a breakdown 
in the elite-citizen social contract, uneven socio-economic development, poor public ser-
vices, widespread corruption etc.) provide only a partial explanation of violent dynamics 
and cannot account for localised disparities.9
By contrast, this paper takes a ground-level view, identifying the many local factors that struc-
ture protest violence within provinces, or within particular urban contexts, and thus explain 
divergent dynamics of violence across the southeast, and between the southeast and the rest 
of Iraq. These factors include: the sociodemographic composition and network structures 
of protest groups, security forces and armed groups; the degree of organisational coherence 
within these groups; past experience, learning, and strategic adaptation on the part of protag-
onists; the degree of competition within a province’s political and economic ‘marketplace’;10 
the strength of (potentially) ameliorative social structures (e.g. tribal); and the degree of 
integration, at both command level and ‘foot-soldier’ level, between ISF, armed groups and 
political parties. Each of these local variables, and their mutual interaction, is shown to have 
an important impact on the violent dynamics surrounding protests.
This focus on local conditions is not intended to deny the importance of macro-structural 
factors, or political actions taken at the national or international level. For instance, the 
development of a more coherent counter-protest political strategy at the level of national 
elites, and the inability of the Prime Minister to alter violent dynamics via shakeups of 
both national and provincial ISF leadership, are highlighted here as impacting on violent 
9   Harith Hasan, ‘Beyond Security: Stabilization, Governance, and Socioeconomic Challenges in Iraq’, 
The Atlantic Council, July 2018; Renad Mansour, ‘Iraq’s 2018 Government Formation: Unpacking the Fric-
tion Between Reform and the Status Quo,’ LSE Middle East Centre Report, 2019; Faleh A. Jabar, ‘The Iraqi 
Protest Movement: From Identity Politics to Issue Politics,’ LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series, 22 June 
2018; Marsin Alshamary, ‘Protestors and Civil Society Actors in Iraq: Between Reform and Revolution,’ 
IRIS Report, December 2020. 
10   Mac Skelton and Zmkan Ali Saleem, ‘Iraq’s Political Marketplace at the Subnational Level: The Strug-
gle for Power in Three Provinces’, LSE Conflict Research Programme, 2020.  
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dynamics. Nevertheless, such factors are always processed through more localised con-
ditions which determine their ultimate effects. And, as in the case of the PM’s limited 
control, it is precisely the prioritisation of the local, over the national, picture that can 
clarify the phenomenon itself.
Rather than simply provide a laundry list of factors, this paper deploys a concept of mul-
tiple social logics of violence that pertain in different sectors of the social system. This 
concept seeks to integrate different factors, and levels of analysis (for example provincial 
or national), into coherent sets of rules, interactions and feedback loops that systematise 
the application of violence within different contexts. The concept of a social logic also 
directs attention towards the rational and strategic aspects of violence, whether deployed 
by protesters or counter-protest actors, and privileges these aspects over the more com-
monplace focus on chaotic, irrational and emotion-driven behaviours, or a loss of control 
by the state over coercive actors. Finally, the concept helps clarify an important aspect of 
the systematic nature of protest violence in Iraq, namely, that parts of this system have 
gained partial autonomy from the control of any specific agent or set of agents but are 
nevertheless still governed by a social logic that relates to a rationalisation of systemic 
power, rather than being a chaotic by-product of systemic dysfunction.
The paper undertakes a granular analysis of protest-related violence in southeast Iraq over 
three key phases of mobilisation, each lasting a period of three months: July-September 
2018; October-December 2019; and October-December 2020. The first two phases saw 
high levels of both protest activity and protest-related violence. The third phase – October 
to December 2020 – covers the period wherein the October 2019 protest movement 
(hereafter, the October Movement) failed to remobilise. Consequently, this latter phase 
allows further exploration of how counter-protest violence impacted the protest move-
ment’s organisational capacity and strategies. 
Further data is also presented on violence outside of protest events, providing a more 
continuous view from September 2019 to January 2021. Including this data recognises that 
one important adaptation by counter-protest forces saw their use of violence shift from 
the more public arenas of protest squares to more intimate, targeted violence outside of 
protest events or periods of peak mobilisation. To contextualise the key arguments of the 
paper, a mini case study is also presented which examines the August 2020 assassination 
campaign against activists in Basra.
The quantitative data presented covers the following dimensions: overall levels and types 
of protest-related violence and anti-protest violence, including that which took place 
outside of protest events (Data Panel 1); and protester-directed violence and protest 
tactics (Data Panel 2). This quantitative data on protest dynamics draws on the author’s 
database of several thousand geolocated incidents of protest and protest-related violence. 
This allows for examining big picture trends and temporal and geographic divergences. 
Nevertheless, to properly contextualise this data, the paper also draws on qualitative data 
from dozens of targeted interviews and informal discussions conducted by the author 
with activists, political actors and informed observers, as well as the author’s own close 
observation of Iraq’s protest movements over several years of research. 
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What Does the Data Show?
Anti-Protest Violence
As can be seen in Data Panel 1, the overall level of violence associated with protests in 
Iraq has escalated dramatically since the summer of 2018. Anti-protest violence, both 
within protest events and outside of protest events, has accelerated. As the author argued 
previously, this counter-protest violence was systematised in Basra during, and after, the 
protests in July and September 2018 (referred to by the author at the time as the ‘Basra 
blueprint’).11 However, from October 2019, this system of repression was expanded across 
central and southern Iraq.
The data collected on Basra’s 2018 protests showed that Iraqi police units were the primary 
tool of repressive violence. However, a division of labour between the police and armed 
groups (either PMF or subcontracted local mafias) also emerged. The latter deployed 
more lethal and intimate forms of violence, typically involving targeted assassinations, kid-
nappings, IED and grenade attacks, and intimidatory small arms fire (typically deployed 
against activists’ homes during the night). While this division of labour emerged locally, 
organically and reactively in summer 2018, it has since become more coherent and stra-
tegic, incorporated into the political logic of actions taken by elites at the national level. 
As seen in Data Panel 1, October to December 2019 saw a further expansion of this repres-
sive model. Police units acted more aggressively to prevent or contain protests, while 
PMF/armed groups expanded a campaign of assassination, kidnap and violent intimi-
dation. This equated to a massive escalation in the deployment of violence outside of 
protest squares and public events, with the intelligence-led targeting of activists at home 
or in transit. Reflecting this shift, the data also shows that the role of PMF/armed groups 
in anti-protest violence increased markedly between 2018 and 2019. This has continued 
during the October to December 2020 phase. 
However, the pattern of violence that developed in Basra from 2018 did not translate 
straightforwardly to other provinces. Some of these divergences are seen in how specific 
counter-protest tactics were adapted to local social and political contexts in other parts 
of Iraq. For instance, Figure 3 shows there were far fewer kidnap incidents in the south-
east, including Basra and Dhi Qar, compared with central Iraq, particularly Baghdad. 
This is likely explained by the comparatively greater salience of tribal networks in the 
southeast. As seen in the case of Sajjad al-Iraqi (an activist kidnapped in Dhi Qar in 
September 2020), tribal involvement can transform a kidnap incident into a complex 
political problem, or risk escalation into a broader conflict. Ultimately, counter-protest 
actors in the southeast have preferred to rely more on intimidatory IEDs and explosive 
attacks to threaten activists, or outright assassinations that carry less risk of entangle-
ment in convoluted tribal politics.
11   Renad Mansour and Benedict Robin-D’Cruz, ‘The Basra Blueprint and the Future of Protest in Iraq,’ 
Chatham House, 8 October 2019.
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However, some of the divergences in violent dynamics (both temporal and geographic) 
appear to apply to the entire landscape of violent repression in a province, rather than spe-
cific counter-protest tactics (such as kidnappings). For instance, in the 2019 phase, overall 
levels of violence in Dhi Qar accelerated past those seen in Basra, including both signif-
icantly higher instances of high intensity/lethal violent incidents, and violence involving 
attacks on buildings and infrastructure. Meanwhile, this latter form of violence all but 
disappeared in Basra. It is also notable that violence perpetrated by PMF/armed groups 
was more muted in Basra during the October to December 2019 phase, but escalated dra-
matically in Dhi Qar during the same period. 
It would be a mistake to interpret the lower levels of counter-protest violence in Basra 
simply in terms of greater restraint shown by the various parties. Rather, what happened 
in Basra was a pivot by ISF towards more strategic and focused deployment of vio-
lence. On the one hand, this did involve ISF showing more restraint in certain contexts. 
For instance, when overall mobilisation levels are low, it has been fairly common for 
some protest groups to use violence against ISF to provoke an aggressive reaction. The 
subsequent images and videos of repressive police tactics are then used to galvanise 
wider engagement in the protests. From October 2019, ISF in Basra demonstrated more 
discipline in not responding to provocations or waiting until they had sustained direct 
attacks before responding. This helped to shift the media narrative around such clashes 
in their favour.12 
However, the most important dimension of ISF’s more strategic use of violence in Basra 
was the linking up of this violence to a broader political strategy. Consequently, ISF 
retained the capacity and willingness to deploy extreme violence, provided this was rein-
forced by coordinated action from other political and coercive actors, typically at the 
national level. This was seen most often vis-à-vis the Sadrist movement, whose moves in 
terms of counter-protests and violence were increasingly mirrored, and consolidated on, 
by ISF and intelligence agencies employing a focused deployment of violence and arrests 
against protesters.13 
12   Article IV (Terrorism) arrests have frequently been used against protest activists as a form of intim-
idation. The cases are rarely prosecuted, but the severe penalties attached to Article IV offences are 
threatening to activists. The ISF response to protests was also more intelligence-led, facilitated by pene-
tration of protest groups and the reliance of the protest movement on social media pages and channels 
to organise protests that were easily accessed by the authorities. This meant ISF were able to use check-
points and searches to prevent access to protest sites, and to make arrests of so-called ‘rioters’ and 
confiscate weapons (such as Molotov cocktails) before they became active in protests.
13   Particularly following Sadr’s withdrawal from the protest movement in late January/early February 
2020, the Sadrists’ role as a counter-protest force has increasingly cohered with the broader system of 
repression. This can be seen in multiple instances where a Sadrist political move at the national level 
triggers aggressive tactics by ISF to clear protest sites, or where ISF appear to stand down to allow 
Sadrist militias to orchestrate similar attacks. One example from Basra took place on 25 January 2020, 
when members of the Shock Forces attacked protesters in Navy Roundabout resulting in tents being 
burned down and protesters being detained. This attack by ISF immediately followed the withdrawal 
of Sadrists from Navy Roundabout in response to political messaging from Sadr at the national level.
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There were other important divergences with respect to provinces in the southeast. Most 
notable, compared to Basra/Dhi Qar, Maysan saw far lower levels of overall violence, fewer 
and less intense clashes between protesters and ISF, but more instances of inter-militia 
violence (typically Sadrist versus Asaʾib Ahl al-Haq) that were still causally tied to protest 
dynamics.14 These broader patterns of divergence are explained below. 
The Kadhimi Effect
Since arriving in office, Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi has repeatedly emphasised his 
government’s commitment to hold those responsible for anti-protest violence to account 
and has sought to improve the conduct of ISF toward protesters. But what does the data 
show about Kadhimi’s impact on anti-protest violence? As seen in Figure 3, violent attacks 
on protesters outside of protest events peaked between November 2019 and February 
2020 (when a combination of Sadrist pressure and the COVID-19 pandemic dramatically 
depressed protest activity). In other words, the rates of protest-related violence had sig-
nificantly declined long before Kadhimi took office in August 2020.15 
Attacks then began to pick up again from August, with a spike in assassinations in Basra 
coinciding with Kadhimi’s visit to the US in late August 2020. ISF actions in Basra fol-
lowing this assassination campaign clarified that, even if ISF were not perpetrating the 
violence, they had little effective response to the militias. This was despite a series of 
high-profile changes in the province’s security leadership and Kadhimi’s repeated direct 
and personal intervention in the Basra situation. This episode is discussed further in the 
mini case study at the end of the report. 
It might be argued that Kadhimi had more success in restraining the excesses of ISF 
violence and repression, even if his government failed to constrain the militias. Indeed, 
much commentary has praised Kadhimi’s appointments within the IA, Ministry of the 
Interior (MoI) and intelligence apparatus, partly on this basis. However, the data does 
not provide strong evidence to support this claim either. Again, referring to Figure 3, 
the major escalation of anti-protest violence from late November 2020, attributed in 
the main to the Sadrist movement, was also accompanied by a systematic campaign 
of arrests by ISF, and an upsurge in violent clashes between protesters and riot police, 
most notably in Dhi Qar. The picture of violence appeared to be a further development 
of the ‘Basra blueprint’, that is, of the systematic division of labour between police and 
militias working hand-in-glove to deploy coercive repression within a broader strategy 
linked to political action at the national level. This logic of violence unfolds more or less 
autonomously from the actions of the Prime Minister. 
14   Benedict Robin-D’Cruz, ‘Violence and Protest in South Iraq,’ LSE Middle East Centre Blog, 18 August 
2020. Available at https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/08/18/violence-and-protest-in-south-iraq/ (accessed 
9 July 2021).
15   This was largely an effect of the collapse of mobilisation due to Sadrist pressure and the COVID-19 pan-
demic, which involved the imposition of curfews and restrictions on movement and social gatherings. 
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Data Panel 1: Protest-Related Violence and Anti-Protest Violence
Figure 1
Comments on the Data
Interpreting the data – The data in Fig.1 shows all 
protest-related violence (counter-protest and protester-di-
rected) classified according to the intensity of violence. 
Mass casualty incidents are those in which at least 
five individuals were killed/injured. High intensity/lethal 
captures incidents resulting in a fatality (e.g., assassina-
tion) or likely to result in serious injury (e.g., an IED). Low 
intensity/intimidatory refers to violence unlikely to lead to 
injury or clearly intended as intimidatory in nature (e.g., 
intimidatory small arms fire used to disperse protesters). 
Buildings/infrastructure refers to incidents where the 
target was a material structure and not a human being 
e.g., empty party offices or government buildings. 
Changes in Basra – Among the notable shifts is the col-
lapse of the buildings/infrastructure violence in Basra in 
2019, reflecting a significant change in protester tactics in 
their deployment of violence. Also notable is that this shift 
did not result in a proportionate decline in overall levels of 
violence in the province.  
Dhi Qar as the most violent province – In the 2019 phase, 
Dhi Qar not only emerges as a major protest hub, but also 
the most violent province in the southeast. This was driv-
en by an escalatory cycle of extreme violence from ISF, 
armed groups and protesters themselves who engaged in 
a considerable amount of property destruction.  
The division of labour in counter-protest violence – 
Fig.2, below, shows the emerging division of labour 
between ISF versus PMF/armed groups in the overall pat-
tern of repressive violence. While the rise in PMF/armed 
group directed violence can be seen clearly, the data 
somewhat understates this dimension. This is because 
the targeted violence – outside of protest events – often 
took place in periods of lower protest mobilisation (either 
prior to, or after peaks). Consequently, the PMF/armed 
group role can be seen more clearly in Fig.3 which covers 
the entire period from October 2019 to December 2020.
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Figure 2
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Figure 3
Comments on the Data
Interpreting the data – The data in Fig.3 
covers anti-protest attacks for all Iraq (ex-
cluding the KRG) that took place outside of 
protest events. This is typically targeted vio-
lence that seeks to kill or intimidate specific 
activists and send a message to the broader 
protest movement. The category ‘explosive 
activity’ collates IED and grenade attacks 
that are usually intimidatory in nature.
A note on arrest figures – Due to a change in 
data collection methodology, the data on ar-
rests is uneven, with arrests not being picked 
up systematically in data collection until mid-
2020. Nevertheless, after this point, the major 
spike in arrests in the southeast (particularly 
Dhi Qar) from November 2020 is notable.
The November/December 2020 spike – 
The surge in anti-protest violence in late 
November 2020 occurred simultaneously 
with moves by the Sadrist movement to 
stifle efforts to revive the October 2019 
movement ahead of the elections sched-
uled for 2021. However, the accompanying 
spike in targeted arrest incidents, many 
of which took place in Dhi Qar, suggests a 
degree of coordination, explicit or implicit, 
between the Sadrists and political and 
security officials in the province.
Assassination as the preferred counter 
-protest tool in the southeast – One clear 
distinction between Basra/Dhi Qar and the 
remainder of Iraq is the predominance of 
assassinations over other forms of count-
er-protest tactics, particularly abductions 
and kidnaps. This is likely attributable to the 
greater influence of tribal networks in the 
southeast (compared to Baghdad) making 
kidnapping incidents potentially more com-
plex and riskier for counter-protest actors.
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Protester-Directed Violence, Tactics and Strategies
The ramping up of anti-protest violence in Basra and Dhi Qar is not explained by higher 
overall rates of protest, nor as simply a reaction to protester-directed violence. In fact, the 
data shows that protester-directed violence fell as a proportion of the overall rate of pro-
tests in the 2019 phase. This was most notable in Basra, where protester-directed violence 
fell dramatically, but this was not matched by a proportionate fall in anti-protest violence. 
More specifically, the data shows that protesters in Basra radically altered their tactics 
between the summer of 2018 and October–December 2019. As seen in Data Panel 2, this 
tactical shift was along two main dimensions. First, protester-directed attacks on ‘sensi-
tive’ targets (political party offices, politicians’ residences, PMF offices and government 
buildings) declined to a negligible level. This also explains the low level of violence in the 
‘buildings/infrastructure’ category for Basra in 2019 (Data Panel 1). And second, there was 
a consolidation of protest tactics, with sit-ins and occupations of public spaces and uni-
versity campuses, and street marches (typically toward an established sit-in/occupation at 
a public square) accounting for most of the protest activity. Consequently, protest-related 
violence in Basra, compared to Dhi Qar, clustered around protester-ISF interactions at 
protest events and the more strategic and focused deployment of massive force against 
protesters (as outlined above).
By contrast, during the same phase, protester-directed violence and tactics in Dhi Qar 
more closely mirrored those seen in Basra during the summer of 2018. Protesters were 
far more likely to hit sensitive targets, and there was a huge amount of property destruc-
tion (both government property and that belonging to political parties and PMF groups). 
There was also a more diverse range of protest tactics, with a rise in public square occu-
pations and sit-ins occurring alongside more protests targeting government buildings, 
logistics (main roads and bridges), and aforementioned sensitive targets. This greater 
diversity of tactics in Dhi Qar could indicate weaker levels of organisation and coher-
ence within the protest movement in the province during this early phase (particularly 
away from the central Habobi Square protest hub). Dhi Qar also saw a more even dis-
tribution of violent interactions between protesters-ISF versus protesters-PMF/armed 
groups. The logic of violence that pertained in this context was one of mutually rein-
forcing incoherence and escalation between fragmentary protest groups and a reactive 
and erratic coercive apparatus.
This Basra-Dhi Qar divergence also indicates that the repression rolled out in Basra 
during, and immediately after, the Summer 2018 protests reshaped the tactics and 
strategies adopted by protesters in the province. A more concerted effort was made to 
maintain the peaceful character of the protests and to focus mobilisations on the Navy 
Roundabout occupation and university campuses (rather than confronting the state/
political elite directly).16 Moreover, the greater participation of students and graduates 
that was noted in Basra also steered the protests in this direction. Particularly for the 
16   Directly here means targeting the state, political elites and armed groups directly with protests or 
violence against their personnel or offices and buildings. 
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period of October to December 2019, it was this student component that created the 
tactical and strategic frame for the movement in Basra, while other groups (including 
youths, Sadrist youths, civil society activists, tribal groups, trade unions etc.), operated 
largely within this frame. Students were also mobilised in Dhi Qar but constituted a 
smaller proportion of the protest movement’s base which was weighted more towards 
youths and local residents spontaneously mobilising via localised, informal social struc-
tures as opposed to formal ‘civil society’ organisation.17
Nevertheless, orchestrating a more peaceful protest politics did not immunise activists 
in Basra from counter-protest violence. While it is true that Basra saw fewer incidents of 
radically destabilising violence, particularly around protest events, it is also true that assas-
sinations and violent intimidation remained a systematic tool for counter-protest groups 
in the province. In fact, it was precisely the social strata most responsible for ensuring the 
largely peaceful character of protests in Basra who were most ruthlessly targeted by coun-
ter-protest groups. However, this violence was more strategically deployed, often taking 
place outside periods of mass mobilisation, and designed to deter protest organisation.
This strategic adaptation to violence on the part of protesters can be clarified through 
the example of the graduate demonstrations that emerged as a major trend in October 
to December 2020 (mainly in Basra, but also present in Dhi Qar). This group were highly 
organised through their own social media channels and highly disciplined in their actions. 
They made a conscious decision to avoid escalatory tactics that could provoke a violent 
backlash from ISF or armed groups. This equated to careful calibration of protests and the 
degree of disruption caused, as well as target selection. Protests remained peaceful and 
focused on Basra Oil Company offices and associated premises in Basra City, and the Dhi 
Qar Oil Company HQ north of Nasiriyah (these offices deal mainly with HR and adminis-
trative matters, not critical commercial operations). 
These graduate protesters also maintained a narrow focus on a transactional demand for 
employment. In other words, they were negotiating entry into the political economy of the 
Iraqi state, not making transformative political demands. Consequently, the protests were 
carefully designed not to threaten elite interests and illustrate that some protesters chose 
to work within the red lines established by counter-protest actors. Notably, a not insignif-
icant number of the graduates involved in these protests were also formerly participants 
in the Navy Roundabout movement from October 2019. Consequently, this case further 
illustrates how counter-protest actors succeeded in fragmenting the October Movement 
and diverting some of its currents into other, less threatening avenues of protest.
17   This observation draws on data collected by the author as part of the present research but not yet 
published. 
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Data Panel 2: Protester-Directed Violence and Tactics
Figure 4
Comments on Tactics Data
Interpreting the data – The data in Figs. 4 and 5 
capture protest tactics, with those most associated 
with the October Movement highlighted in orange. 
High-risk tactics – i.e., those in which protesters aim 
for sensitive targets such as PMF and political party 
offices, are highlighted in red. Secondary tactics is 
a category that drills down further into a series of 
sub-categories linked to a primary meta-category. 
Tactical shift in Basra – Among the most notable 
tactical shifts took place in Basra between 2018 and 
2019. Not only did protester tactics in Basra con-
solidate in 2019, but they also showed considerable 
strategic discipline by avoiding sensitive targets. 
This was a marked shift from the Summer of 2018 
when government buildings, PMF and political party 
offices were hit on a regular basis.  
Tactical diversification as an indicator of move-
ment fragmentation – The other notable shift in the 
post-uprising phase was a diversification of protest 
tactics. This is another likely sign of fragmentation 
of the October Movement as protesters diverted 
into different protest strategies. However, it is 
notable that sensitive targets remained low, and fell 
considerably in Dhi Qar, illustrating the disciplining 
effect of counter-protest violence.
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Figure 5
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Figure 6
Comments on Protester- 
Directed Violence Data
Interpreting the data – Fig. 6 shows recorded 
incidents of protester-directed violence by 
violence type and target selection. Highlighted 
in red are the ‘sensitive’ targets, e.g., ISF, PMF/
armed group, political party or politician, in-
tended to capture violence that was extremely 
high risk and likely to provoke an escalation 
from counter-protest groups. 
The Basra transformation – As with data on 
protest tactics, the data on protester-directed vi-
olence shows a pronounced retreat from violent 
tactics in Basra in 2019, while protester-directed 
violence in Dhi Qar against all manner of sensi-
tive targets escalated dramatically. Within this, a 
further shift took place in Basra where protest-
er-directed violence was limited to encounters 
with ISF (mainly police) and attacks on political 
parties and PMF/armed groups fell away.
The Sadrist exception in Dhi Qar – It is clear 
from the data that protesters in Dhi Qar 
systematically targeted political parties and 
PMF/armed groups across the board. However, 
the one exception to this was the Sadrist 
movement, who were rarely, if ever, targeted 
by protesters. This anomaly is explained by 
the fact that the Sadrist movement poses 
a different type of risk to protesters. During 
discussions with the author, it was common 
for activists to identify the Sadrist movement 
as the most feared counter-protest actor owing 
to their perception that the Sadrists were 
both more extreme and more unpredictable in 
their use of violence, whereas it was felt that 
violence from other armed groups could be 
more easily mitigated by strategic adaptation 
to their red lines.
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Further Explaining Violent Dynamics: Local Social Logics and the Politics 
of the Security Sector
Understanding some of the broader patterns of protest-related violence in southeast 
Iraq, and how these shifted over time and varied widely between provinces, is helped by 
contextualising violence within local social conditions and politics, and particularly the 
politics of Iraq’s security apparatus. This section looks more closely at these local con-
texts for Basra and Dhi Qar, while also bringing Maysan into the picture as a further point 
of comparison in the southeast region. 
Maysan: A Sadrist Stronghold
With reference to data published by the author elsewhere, it can be seen that Maysan has 
experienced comparatively low levels of protest-related violence compared to Basra and 
Dhi Qar.18 In part, this is likely a reflection of the province’s smaller size (in population 
terms), but also the lower stakes of political competition in the province owing to May-
san’s relative lack of economic resources. This means competitive political dynamics are 
less intense.
Compounding this characteristic is Maysan’s status as a Sadrist stronghold, with the 
movement enjoying high levels of support amongst the general population as well as a 
preponderance of power at the executive and administrative levels. This resulted in a 
fairly unique dynamic between protesters, political authority and security forces in the 
province, partly explaining why interactions between ISF and protesters in Maysan have 
been less violent. 
In fact, little protest violence in Maysan was recorded, in part, because violence around 
protests in the province was so quickly escalated into intra-militia engagements (not clas-
sified as protest-related violence for the purposes of this report) between the Sadrists 
and rival armed group Asaʾib Ahl al-Haq (AAH). The intensity of Sadrist-AAH conflict in 
Maysan eventually spilled over into Basra and Dhi Qar, resulting in a string of assassina-
tions targeting Saraya al-Salam figures in these provinces.19
Basra: Political Fragmentation and PMF Penetration of the Security Apparatus
In Basra, the stakes of political competition are far higher, due mainly to the province’s oil 
economy. Consequently, the political and security landscape in Basra is more intensely 
18   Benedict Robin-D’Cruz, ‘Violence and Protest in South Iraq,’ LSE Middle East Centre Blog, 18 August 
2020. Available at https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/08/18/violence-and-protest-in-south-iraq/ (accessed 
19 August 2021).
19   These began with a Sadrist attack on AAH offices in Maysan on 25 October 2019. Multiple attacks on 
Saraya al-Salam militiamen followed in Maysan, Basra and Dhi Qar. The pattern of attacks persisted 
until the 5 February 2020 assassination of Abu Muqtada al-Izairjawi (Saraya al-Salam) outside his home 
in Amarha (Maysan), and the 6 February assassination of Hazim al-Helfi (Saraya al-Salam) on Muham-
mad al-Qassim road in Basra. The dissipation of this violence likely reflected intense mediation efforts 
by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps following the assassination of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in 
January 2020.
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contested, and the resulting fragmentation of the province’s political field has been an 
important driver of protest-related violence in some instances.20 Nevertheless, recognis-
ing the effects of political competition should not overshadow the important integrative 
dynamics which confer greater coherence on how political and security actors respond to 
protests. These integrative logics tend to take over from competitive dynamics when the 
system shifts toward a defensive posture. Consequently, they are especially relevant during 
phases where protest mobilisations pose a radical challenge to the political system.
The fragmentary factor is most important for understanding protest violence in relation to 
the Sadrist movement. The Sadrists are well represented amongst Basra’s youth and have 
constituted a significant bloc of the province’s protesters.21 However, unlike in Maysan, 
the political makeup of Basra’s security apparatus results in a markedly different dynamic 
between Sadrist protesters and security forces. Moreover, the Sadrists are one of several 
factions who compete for power in the province’s political, economic and security fields. 
This provides the Sadrists with more targets for violence (in the form of rival political and 
militia groups). Moreover, a portion of Sadrist protest violence is a function of the move-
ment’s competition in these fields – it is a mechanism of threat, pressure and leverage 
within intra-elite competition.
However, while these fragmentary dynamics drive certain forms of protest-related vio-
lence, the overall systemic pattern of repression (the division of labour between ISF and 
PMF/armed groups noted above) relates to an increasingly integrative dynamic within 
Basra’s security sector. This refers to how Basra’s security apparatus became more inte-
grated with the PMF, especially its dominant forces in the Badr Organisation and Abu 
Mahdi al-Muhandis-Kataʾib Hezbollah (prior to Muhandis’ assassination). This conti-
nuity between the ISF (primarily the police forces) and PMF groups helps explain the 
broader model of systemic violence in Basra, not as an effect of fragmentation, but as a 
coherent pattern of violence shaped by it having a more consolidated and coherent set of 
actors, with a more unified strategic purpose, as its point of origin.
For example, the police formation directing most of the anti-protest violence in Basra 
(in both summer 2018 and October to December 2019), was the so-called police Shock 
Forces (quwaat al-sadma).22 The Shock Forces are somewhat unique to Basra (in other 
provinces protests are handled mainly by Anti-Riot and, to a lesser extent, SWAT units 
who mainly conduct arrests). The unit was created in 2018 out of the Basra Emergency 
Police Battalions and was intended initially as a specialist force to tackle narcotics and 
tribal disputes. However, the Shock Forces were repurposed in summer 2018 by Basra 
Governor Asaad al-Idani as the front-line unit for dealing with protests. 
20   Zmkan Ali Saleem & Mac Skelton, ‘Basra’s Political Marketplace: Understanding Government Failure 
After The Protests,’ IRIS Policy Brief, April 2019.
21   ‘Sadrists’ here refers to a broad category that encompasses Iraqi youths with a Sadri orientation rooted 
in social class, familial and tribal networks, and not necessarily integrated into the organisational-insti-
tutional structure of the Sadrist movement. 
22   Due to its negative reputation in Basra, the Shock Forces have recently been renamed the ‘Duty Force’. 
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The unit’s commander was Brigadier Ali Mishari al-Muhamadawi. Mishari was closely 
affiliated to Badr and protesters frequently accused him of links to Kataʾib Hezbollah.23 
Meanwhile, the IP members who made up the Shock Forces – drawn from Basra’s Emer-
gency Police Battalions – contained a not insignificant number of PMF members who 
were operational around Samarra during the fight against Islamic State. The force gained 
considerable notoriety in Basra, with protesters persistently calling for Mishari’s resigna-
tion. On 16 July 2020, Mishari was demoted to become head of the Basra Police Martyrs 
and Wounded Department. The Shock Forces were officially dissolved (resubmerged into 
the Emergency Police Battalions), and Faw Police Station Manager Col. Kadhum Qadir 
Draweesh was promoted to head that force. 
Similar dynamics can be seen further up the chain of command. Here, power had con-
glomerated in a nexus between Governor Idani and Basra’s Chief of Police Rashid al-Fleih, 
who was strongly backed by Badr and was also instrumental in bringing in Mishari as 
head of the Shock Forces. The Idani-Fleih relationship succeeded in shifting the balance 
of power in Basra’s security apparatus away from the Iraqi Army and towards the police. 
The result was the sidelining of Qasim Nizal al-Maliki, then Commander General (CG) 
of Basra Operations Command (BaOC), who retired from his post in early August 2020. 
Indeed, the power to appoint provincial police directors is a contested issue between the 
MoI and provincial governments, with the latter regarding this power as an important 
mechanism for maintaining their political influence over the security apparatus (whereas 
the IA chain of command makes the BaOC CG accountable to the Chief of Staff of the 
Joint Operations Command (JOC), who reports to the Commander in Chief/PM).
The BaOC CG is meant to be the most senior security position in the province with oper-
ational control over the police (although this arrangement is a legacy of the post-2003 
period and does not have a strong legal basis).24 In practice, the BaOC has taken the lead 
on tactical plans and operations that require combined forces involving Iraqi police and 
IA units, typically to tackle outbreaks of tribal fighting. However, in the past this has also 
involved coordinating the response to protests and civil unrest. 
23   ‘He Made it a Tool of Repression in Basra: Who is the Leader of the Shock Forces?’, al-Hurra, 25 
January 2020.
24   The MoI is meant be taking full control of security in cities in Federal Iraq. On 17 June 2020, the MoI 
announced that the police are taking over the security portfolio from the Joint Operations Command 
(JOC) in seven provinces. Earlier, in February 2020, the NSC announced a transfer of security respon-
sibilities to the police in six provinces where JOC were present (Babylon, Najaf, Diwaniyah, Wasit, 
Muthanna, and Maysan). However, the decision was not fully implemented. JOCs between the police 
and the Iraqi Army continue in Baghdad, Karbala, Dhi Qar, Basra Anbar Salah al-Din, Kirkuk Diyala and 
Mosul.  An important factor in the delay (of this transition of security responsibilities to the police) 
relates to differences between Federal and Provincial governments. JOCs in the provinces report to the 
Chief of Staff of the JOC, who reports to the Commander in Chief/PM. On the other hand, local govern-
ments in the provinces have more influence over the police. In theory, a provincial police commander 
cannot function in permanent/standing capacity without a vote from the Provincial Council in each 
province. However, in practice, the MoI did appoint several provincial police commanders in acting 
capacity without PCs voting (particularly as PCs are now suspended). The matter remains a contested 
point between the Federal and Provincial Governments. 
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Consequently, during the summer 2018 protests, it was the then-BaOC CG, Lieuten-
ant-General Jamil al-Shammari, who oversaw the violent crackdown on protesters in the 
city that resulted in 18 protesters being fatally shot by ISF. As a result, Shammari was 
removed from his post by then-PM Haider al-Abadi. Nevertheless, Shammari, who comes 
from a powerful family (Shammari’s brother is Abd al-Amir al-Shamiri, the current IA 
Deputy Commander of JOC) with close links to Nouri al-Maliki, was briefly re-posted to 
Dhi Qar in 2019 to oversee the crackdown on protesters there.
By contrast, Shammari’s replacement as BaOC CG, Qasim Nizal al-Maliki, played a much 
more subdued role than his predecessor, allowing de facto power to gather around Gov-
ernor Idani and Chief of Police Fleih. Maliki’s supposedly hands-off approach to his 
position was often attributed to his lack of interest and ambition compared to Fleih (he 
was reaching retirement age). However, there were strong rumours – albeit unverified – 
that in October 2019 Maliki refused a phone request from Governor Idani to deploy Iraqi 
Army units against protesters at Navy Roundabout in Basra City. It is possible that this 
refusal partly explains the sidelining of the CG as other security actors (Fleih, Mishari) 
stepped into the breach to take the lead on counter-protest activity.
In any case, the foregoing establishes that theoretical boundaries between Iraq’s security 
forces, political parties and the PMF have not been borne out in reality. The division of 
labour between police units and PMF/armed groups in anti-protest violence should not 
be understood as a form of tacit cooperation between state and non-state forces. This 
depiction obfuscates the continuities between the PMF and Basra’s security apparatus. 
PM Kadhimi has repeatedly used appointments in the security sector to try and extend his 
own zone of authority and signal to protesters that he is listening to their demands for restrain-
ing counter-protest violence. However, the PM’s strategy has often served more to clarify the 
limits of his power. This is due to both the nature of the new appointments themselves (who 
he has put in place and the accompanying quid pro quo deals), and also the limited gains 
these new appointments have been able to deliver, at least from the protesters’ perspective. 
In the case of Basra, PM Kadhimi oversaw an extensive reshuffling of the top security 
posts. As noted above, BaOC CG Maliki was moved into retirement and Shock Forces 
Commander Mishari was demoted. These moves took place in the weeks leading up to the 
assassination campaign against activists in Basra in late August 2020. Tahseen Osama was 
assassinated in the Junaina area of Basra City on 14 August. On 17 August, three more activ-
ists were targeted in an assassination incident in the city’s Kut al-Hajjaj neighbourhood. 
This triggered the removal of Basra’s Chief of Police Rashid al-Fleih. However, Fleih’s 
removal did not prevent assassins from murdering Riham Yacoub in Basra two days later. 
The head of the Basra branch of the National Security Service (NSS) was also rumoured 
to have been removed following the assassinations (the NSS is a powerful intelligence 
agency created by Nouri al-Maliki via an Executive Order in 2013, meaning the agency has 
no basis in law or the constitution. The NSS was previously headed by PMF Chairman 
Falih al-Fayadh, whom Kadhimi replaced with the former head of the Counter Terrorism 
Service (CTS), Lt. Gen. Abd al-Ghani al-Asadi).25
25   Amongst CTS leadership, Asadi was considered to have the closest relationship with the PMF. 
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Consequently, the response to the assassination campaign in Basra was headed up by new 
personnel across the board. CG Maliki was replaced by Maj. Gen Akram Saddam Midnef 
(Maliki’s deputy). The new CG had a fairly low political profile, but his background as 
former acting CG of Diyala OC suggests he has good working relations with Badr (as 
Diyala is a Badr stronghold). As an internal promotion, his elevation was likely designed 
not to upset the status quo. Midnef has been tasked with reasserting a more active role for 
the BaOC in provincial security matters. This has translated into increased media profile 
for the CG and more operations targeting tribal fighting. 
General Abbas Naji, who took over as Chief of Police, was another internal promotion as 
Naji worked as Fleih’s Deputy prior to the latter’s removal. Naji’s career has been almost 
entirely within the police’s internal affairs branch (Inspection Offices), including most 
recently as Director of the Basra Governor’s Inspection Office. Naji’s background suggests 
he has good relations with Idani and his lack of operational commands could be a further 
indication of the intention to shift the balance of power back to the BaOC CG in terms of 
overall strategic and tactical operational planning for the province. Like Midnef, Naji was 
another promotion unlikely to cause controversy and deemed acceptable to Basra’s main 
political players. It is not particularly surprising, then, that the new appointments failed to 
inspire many positive reactions from the protest movement in Basra. This scepticism was 
later bourne out by the failure of security leadership to deliver accountability for assassi-
nations in the province (see mini case study below).
Dhi Qar: Epicentre of the Youth-Quake
Several interlinking factors explain the social logic of violence in Dhi Qar and its higher 
levels of protest-related violence from 2019. The most important relate to a breakdown in 
non-coercive systems of domination over the province’s youth (who figured more prom-
inently in the protest base in Dhi Qar than any other province). Dhi Qar has some of the 
highest poverty rates in all of Iraq. In the southeast, only Muthanna and parts of Maysan 
have comparative levels of extreme poverty. By contrast, Basra shows comparatively 
lower poverty levels, and the province is a target for internal migration for work within the 
southeast region, owing mainly to its energy resources and trade links.26 These factors have 
also made Basra a strategic priority for the GoI in recent years, while other provinces in the 
southeast have been largely neglected. 
However, unlike Muthanna and Maysan, Dhi Qar has significant urban populations. 
Nasiriyah has a population of over half a million, which equates to the entire population 
of Maysan and is more than twice the size of Samawah. Urbanisation tends to produce 
social atomisation, disconnecting people from traditional social structures. If the salience 
of tribal networks were plotted on a graph, with Amarah and Samawah being cities where 
this salience is most pronounced, and Baghdad being the least, Nasiriyah and Basra City 
would be somewhere in the middle. This factor of population scale and urbanisation in 
26   ‘Where are Iraq’s Poor: Mapping Poverty in Iraq’, World Bank (2015). Available at https://open-
knowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/22351/Where0are0Iraq0ping0poverty0in0Iraq.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed 9 July 2021).
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Dhi Qar indicates a weakening of traditional social structures that transmit authority and 
ameliorate conflict within the social system as a whole. Consequently, the province sits at 
a critical intersection of extreme poverty and unemployment combined with a weakening 
of these ameliorative social structures.27
Added to this, compared to Basra, the leadership in Dhi Qar has had fewer tools with 
which to bargain with the province’s disaffected youths. In Basra, Governor Idani has 
sought to utilise financial resources raised from the province’s border trade, and alloca-
tions from oil and gas production, to fund salaries for new public sector jobs.28 Idani has 
also been assisted by the relatively deep financial pockets and political clout of the Basra 
Oil Company, which took 2,000 of Basra’s unemployed youths, assigned jobs via Idani’s 
2019 ‘jobs lottery’, directly onto the books of the MoO.29 These avenues for off-ramping 
unemployed youths from protest activism are less available to the leadership in Dhi Qar.
The breakdown in non-coercive systems of domination in Dhi Qar likely explains why 
authorities in the province reached so quickly for coercive tools when protests escalated 
in October 2019. The deployment of General Jamil al-Shammari to oversee a crackdown 
on protesters in Nasiriyah suggests that provincial and national leadership regarded Dhi 
Qar as more combustible even than Basra and opted for extreme violence in a desperate 
effort to clamp down. This resulted in a higher rate of mass casualty incidents (Data Panel 
1), most notably the Zaitoon Bridge massacre in late November 2019. This ISF-directed 
violence was a major contributing factor in sending Dhi Qar into an escalatory cycle that 
further eroded systems of domination over the province’s youths. 
Prime Minister Kadhimi has also overseen multiple changes to senior security leadership 
in Dhi Qar. Shortly after the PM took office in May, Brigadier General Hazem Muhammad 
al-Waeli replaced Brigadier General Nasser Latif Al-Asadi as Chief of Police. The head of 
the Federal Intelligence and Investigations Agency (MoI) Dhi Qar Directorate was also 
replaced by Colonel Aziz al-Shami at the same time. These moves, some of the first of 
the new administration, were intended as an early signal to the protest movement that 
Kadhimi was determined to change how ISF dealt with protesters. 
In early September 2020, there was also a shakeup on the military side, with the crea-
tion of Sumer Operations Command – headquartered at the Imam Ali airbase south of 
Nasiriyah – replacing Rafidain OC, now covering Dhi Qar, Muthanna and Maysan. Sumer 
Operations Command was headed by Major General Imad Majhoul Sumaidam and his 
Deputy is Major General Jawad Abbas Abd Ali. Following a further violent escalation 
around protests in the province in November 2020, Hazem al-Waeli was sacked as Chief 
of Police and replaced by Major Salim Aboud. 
As in Basra, ISF in Dhi Qar have struggled to assert their autonomy vis-à-vis political 
factions and armed groups. Politically, the province is divided up between the main Shiʿi 
27   Based on interview conducted by the author with an Iraqi expert on tribal structures, December 2020. 
28   The petrodollar allocation.
29   Although these employees have also experienced salary delays due to the absence of a budget law. 
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Islamist factions, where former Governor Nadhim al-Waeli was backed by a Sadrist-Fa-
tah agreement. However, the governorship has emerged as a focus of political struggles 
between the Sadrists and Nouri al-Maliki, with Sadr backing Waeli while Maliki has been 
seeking to have him replaced. Maliki also sought a tougher response by Kadhimi and ISF 
to protesters in Dhi Qar. On 21 August 2020, Maliki gave a television interview in which he 
claimed that Dhi Qar had fallen under the control of ‘youths’ acting like ‘anarchists’ and 
‘outlaws’ and stated that: ‘We need a plan to impose the law, to mobilise, and deal with 
those who transgress the prestige and authority of the state.’30 However, Sadrist violence 
against protesters in Habobi Square in November 2020 showed that it was Sadr himself, 
not the PM nor ISF, who possessed the local coercive capacity to put out the lights of 
Habobi Square after over a year of determined resistance by protesters in the province. 
Although some of the province’s tribes have taken a more pro-protester stance or have 
sought to mediate to reduce tensions around the protests (particularly the Badour and 
Abouda tribes), many are also deeply interwoven with the PMF. The extent of these ties 
came to the surface in mid-September, when local tribal resistance forced a halt to a 
CTS operation attempting to free kidnapped activist Sajjad al-Iraqi. The operation impli-
cated the Al-Askara tribe, headed by Kadhim al-Shibrum, in the kidnapping and the tribe 
received protection from Badr and AAH. Kataʾib Hezbollah (KH) is also a major power in 
the province, although working more behind, and through, groups like AAH. KH also has 
a hand in the province’s security committee. 
As in the case of Basra, these continuities between the security apparatus and political, 
tribal and armed group networks, have resulted in coordinated counter-protest action 
against youths in Dhi Qar who have endured an incredible degree of violence. This has 
undercut the credibility of the PM’s efforts to change how ISF deal with demonstrations 
and rein in armed groups. As argued above in the case of Basra, Dhi Qar has also seen a 
shift by ISF towards more strategic and focused use of violence. This may be more effec-
tive as a counter-protest strategy, but it should not be confused with showing restraint. 
Mini Case Study: The August 2020 Assassination Campaign in Basra
Between 14 and 19 August 2020, a series of assassination incidents took place in Basra. On 
14 August, gunmen arrived at an apartment where a 30-year-old Basra activist, Tahseen 
Osama, operated an internet services company. The gunmen entered the offices and shot 
the activist twelve times. Osama’s brother was immobilised by a gunshot wound to the 
leg. Police initially attributed the attack to localised criminality, claiming to have recov-
ered narcotics paraphernalia from the site. On 17 August, three activists were targeted in 
an attempted assassination which took place in Kut al-Hajjaj. Gunmen driving a white 
Toyota Crown opened fire on the target’s vehicle as it was parked near a local church. 
Abbas Subhi, 35 years old, was seriously injured. A well-known female activist, 26-year-
old Louida Rimun Bulis, sustained light injuries. A third male in the vehicle escaped the 
attack unscathed. Then, on 19 August, 30-year-old Riham Yacoub, a graduate in sports 
science who ran a women’s health and fitness centre in Basra, was assassinated. Yacoub 
30   ‘Fallen governorates comment triggers Iraqi anger against Maliki’, al-Hurra, 19 August 2020. 
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was sitting inside a vehicle at Jumhuriya Intersection in Basra City when gunmen opened 
fire. She died from a bullet wound to the head, while two other women in the vehicle sus-
tained injuries.
While Osama and Bulis were prominent activists in Basra during the October protests, 
Yacoub had far more tenuous links to protest activism (despite claims following her assas-
sination that she was a protest leader).31 In reality, Yacoub was not a protest leader nor a 
political activist. She had withdrawn from participation in the protests after 2018, and she 
was never a leading protest organiser prior to this. Consequently, the commonalities and 
differences between these cases reveal much about the social logic of protest violence in 
Basra. The response of political and security leadership following the assassinations also 
shows why, even when the Prime Minister becomes personally involved in a case, the 
prospect of obtaining accountability for such killings is remote.
Yacoub was one of several civil society actors in Basra whom the author had been follow-
ing for several years. In the summer of 2018, her name, along with several other young 
Basrawis, got caught up in a controversy surrounding the US Consulate in Basra. A con-
spiracy theory – initiated by Iranian state news agency Mehr – was circulated in Iraq, 
accusing a group of young people who participated in the Iraqi Young Leaders Exchange 
Program (IYLEP, funded by the US Embassy in Baghdad) of being agents in a US plot to 
orchestrate violent protests in Basra. This was mid-September 2018, approximately a week 
after protesters in Basra had burned down the Iranian consulate building in the province 
(along with many offices belonging to Iraqi political parties and armed groups). 
The young Basrawis accused by Mehr were not US agents. In fact, most of them were not 
even involved in the protests. Another of Mehr’s targets, a university student, told the 
author how he was woken at one in the morning by a barrage of messages on his social 
media accounts: 
I was accused of starting all the protests that took place in Basra, that I was the 
mastermind of all the chaos that was happening… It was very ironic because all 
those claims were completely false. First of all, I was preparing for my exams, 
and secondly, I never knew anything about politics and don’t even talk about or 
discuss it!
This young man, an aspiring Youtuber, was forced to flee Basra altogether and still resides 
outside Iraq to this day. Why was he targeted? He told the author: ‘The militias can elimi-
nate people, just like that, just because they’re different and productive people who try to 
make a difference in their own world.’ 
Yacoub’s own involvement in the protests was slight. She told the author that she took 
part in some of the demonstrations in 2018 and had encouraged a few dozen women to 
join the marches with her. A photo she had taken of herself with these female protesters 
31   A video even circulated widely on social media claiming to show Yacoub leading protesters in chants 
during recent demonstrations in the province. However, the woman in the video was not Yacoub and 
the protest was not in Basra.
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was used by Mehr, along with photos featuring Yacoub published by IYLEP, to construct 
their conspiracy by connecting the protests to Yacoub and Yacoub to the other partici-
pants in the IYLEP program and the US consulate. This was picked up by Iran-aligned 
political groups in Iraq and circulated widely. Yacoub was clearly scared: ‘I was threatened 
from unknown sources, there was incitement to kill me. My pictures spread everywhere.’ 
She told the author that her name had also been placed on a monitoring list held by ISF 
in Basra.
Yacoub’s family were ultimately able to intervene on her behalf and to have her name 
removed from the list (or so it seemed). In return, Yacoub withdrew from protest activity. 
This sort of negotiation has been fairly common in Basra. When an activist is threatened 
by an armed group and their name put on a monitoring or assassination list, they are 
sometimes able to draw on tribal networks, or wider social ties, to intercede on their 
behalf. Yacoub’s family are part of Basra’s powerful Imara tribe (concentrated particularly 
around the Madaina area in northern Basra), and although she never stated so explicitly 
in communications with the author, it is probable that a tribal intervention had smoothed 
over the controversy on a temporary basis. 
In Osama’s case, the tribal factor came to the fore following his assassination. Osama’s 
family are from the Shahmani tribe, a sub-tribe of the Mayaha concentrated in Madaina 
and Qurna in northern Basra. After Osama’s killing, his family threatened a tribal escalation 
if his killers were not identified and brought to justice. The statements came following an 
apparent snub by the Prime Minister who visited Yacoub’s family during his visit to Basra, 
but did not visit Osama’s family. In any event, the threat of tribal escalation was most 
likely intended to generate a tribal dispute and subsequent settlement over the killing, and 
never escalated beyond verbal threats.
Although Yacoub was not a protest leader, her social background fits a similar profile to 
the other activists targeted in the August campaign, and those targeted by violence outside 
of protest events more broadly. These individuals tend to be slightly older than many 
of the protesting youths (typically in their mid-to-late 20s or 30s), come from middle 
class families, are university educated and in employment, and are disproportionately 
female.32 This is not the social profile of the young men who, around the time of the 
August assassinations, were involved in violent clashes with ISF in Basra and were throw-
ing petrol bombs at police vehicles, Iraqi police members and government buildings. This 
disjuncture between the purveyors of protest violence, and the targets of counter-protest 
violence, requires explanation. 
The reason is that the young men responsible for most of this protester-directed vio-
lence are disproportionately Sadrist youths from Basra’s poorer neighbourhoods such as 
Hayy al-Hussein, Khamsa Meel and Tamimiyya. A characteristic of this group has been a 
propensity for violence against a wide variety of targets from government buildings and 
politicians to political parties and militias considered enemies or rivals of the Sadrist 
32   Disproportionate when considered against the size of female participation in Basra’s protest move-
ment. 
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trend. Nevertheless, the group’s socio-economic insecurity makes them easier to buy off 
with promises of jobs or money when compared to their middle-class counterparts.33 Con-
sequently, despite their propensity for violence, this group is more containable and less 
threatening to the political system. Their violence may even partly serve the interests of 
political factions who want to portray the protest movement as ‘anarchic’ and destructive. 
Moreover, these young men typically belong to families that are both tribally engaged 
(meaning their tribal networks are more active),34 and to have brothers, uncles and cousins 
involved in different PMF or other armed groups. AAH cannot send assassins into Khamsa 
Meel to kill a Sadrist youth without risking repercussions or complications (whether from 
Sadrist or tribal escalation).35 A Sadrist youth could quite possibly have an older brother 
in AAH who could potentially intercede on his behalf, or warn him of possible violence, 
helping the youth to mitigate threats. Finally, when the organised element of the Sadrist 
movement wants to exert its authority over these youths, it can rely on pressure from 
older males in their families to help withdraw them from the streets. 
By contrast, the activists targeted for assassination tend to be those who have helped 
steer Basra’s protest movement toward more peaceful channels. They have also sought to 
elevate its demands from transactional claims for jobs or better local services, into a more 
political movement focused on calls for systemic political transformation. It is this latter 
aspect, and particularly the potential role they could play in turning the protests into a 
new political platform to compete in Iraq’s national elections (tentatively scheduled for 
October 2021), that marked the activists out as a threat.
At the same time, they also lack a coercive shield or deterrence. They are less likely to have 
strong networks that tie them to PMF and other armed groups (although the boundaries 
between such networks are often less clear cut than might be thought), and their families 
are likely to be less tribally engaged. For instance, Yacoub’s father, a retired navy captain, 
told local media following his daughter’s killing, that he does not want tribal vengeance, 
but the justice promised to him personally by Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, that is, 
the justice of the Iraqi state.
The assassination of Yacoub is a more complex case given that she was not a political 
organiser or even prominent protest activist. So why was she killed? For Iraq’s armed 
groups, and their patrons in Iran’s intelligence apparatus, the fact that Yacoub was a 
33   In one recent case, a young man active in Basra’s protests was arrested during a violent demon-
stration. Governor Assad al-Idani met with the youth in a televised recording at Basra Police HQ. He 
reminded the youth that he had previously obtained jobs for him and some of his friends who had been 
protesting earlier in the year. However, the youth revealed he had sold the job for cash in order to buy a 
taxi. In the end, the young protester was released and Idani pledged to build his family a new home. The 
youth was later filmed returning home to family and praising Idani’s generosity. 
34   Notably, among the activists targeted in the August assassination campaign, Osama came from a more 
modest socio-economic background.
35   It is worth recalling here the incident in Maysan following the outbreak of protests in October 2019, in 
which AAH militiamen opened fire on protesters at one of their offices, only to come under direct fire 
from Sadrist paramilitaries, resulting in one death and several injures to AAH gunmen. 
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high-profile female voice in local civil society activism was one reason she would be on 
their radar. It is not only political action that threatens these groups. They also cannot 
tolerate Iraqi youth who are determined to reject their system of violence and corruption 
and to strive to create a way of life for themselves beyond the militias’ reach. 
However, it should also be noted that Yacoub came from a similar social milieu to the more 
politically active protest organisers. Consequently, her killing sends an impactful message 
to this group, a warning that anyone who gains prominence and becomes a symbol around 
which resistance can be organised, risks assassination. This was a stark message against 
a backdrop of attempts that were ongoing at that time to organise the protest movement 
ahead of the 2021 elections. Many activists who had been preparing the ground for the 
protest movement’s first political steps went underground following the assassinations. 
Yacoub’s killing also reminds activists that the armed groups have long memories, and 
that once your name goes on the list, it can never truly be removed.
Finally, the targeting of Yacoub was clearly timed to coincide with Kadhimi’s trip the US as 
part of the Strategic Dialogue between the two countries. Her superficial and largely fab-
ricated interactions with the US consulate tied together the narrative of the assassination 
from the perspective of those seeking to undermine US-Iraq relations. This strongly sug-
gests direct involvement from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. In this sense, 
like the assassination of Hisham al-Hashimi in Baghdad in July, Yacoub’s murder, more so 
than the other activists targeted in August, looked like a personal challenge to the author-
ity of the Iraqi Prime Minister and a warning against drawing too close to the US. 
The Prime Minister appeared to draw the same conclusion, returning from the US and 
heading straight to Basra to oversee the response of the province’s security apparatus to 
the assassinations. Kadhimi also visited Yacoub’s family, where he promised them swift 
justice for their daughter’s killing. On the evening of 22 August, Kadhimi convened a 
meeting of Basra security leadership at the BaOC, also attended by the head of Iraq’s CTS, 
Lt. Gen. Abd al-Wahaab al-Saadi. 
According to a statement later released by the PM, Kadhimi told ISF present at the 
meeting: ‘You must work with all possible means to provide security for the people of 
Basra. However, there have been assassinations committed, and we have not seen action 
equivalent to the seriousness of this crime… I wait for serious action from you, and you 
must detect the criminals as soon as possible.’ Kadhimi also reportedly stated: ‘There is no 
place for the fearful within the security services… Whoever makes mistakes and who fails 
will not remain in his place, and he will be held accountable according to disciplinary laws.’ 
As noted above, the security response to the assassinations would be headed by new ISF 
leadership across the board (including a new BaOC CG and Chief of Police). Neverthe-
less, the province-wide security plan that was implemented, named Operation Faithful 
Promise, had little connection to anti-protest violence. Faithful Promise was directed by 
the BaOC and involved joint operations across the province (involving units from the Iraqi 
Army, Iraqi police, border force, PMF intelligence directorate, NSS, and Navy). Searches 
were conducted for wanted individuals, ‘unlicensed weapons’ and contraband. Faithful 
34 The Social Logics of Protest Violence in Iraq: Explaining Divergent Dynamics in the Southeast
Promise involved so many different security agencies and groups that operational security 
was weak, and most operations were flagged in advance. 
The raids typically resulted in a handful of arrests along with seizures of weapons, narcotics 
and alcohol. The focus of the operation shifted quickly from the assassinations to contain-
ing armed tribal disputes. Meanwhile, the MoI handed down its own security plan for Basra 
City, involving Iraqi police units putting up additional checkpoints and issuing fines for 
vehicles with tinted windows36 or lacking the requisite registration documents. The overall 
impression was that the measures taken were more theatrical than substantive. 
On 14 February 2021, PM Kadhimi announced that members of a death squad responsible 
for a long list of political assassinations had been arrested in Basra. According to the Tac-
tical Cell,37 the arrested individuals confessed to carrying out the assassination in Basra of 
Makki al-Tamimi (Tamimi was head of the BPC committee dealing with slums and illegal 
housing settlements in the city); activist Mujtaba Ahmad Jassim (AKA Mujtaba al-Zaa-
jal) in Hindiya district; civil society activist Jannan Madhi Shamkhi (AKA Umm Janat); 
journalists Ahmad Abd al-Dhamad and Safaa Ghaali in Shamsumiya; an attack on the 
residence of Basra Governor Asaad al-Idani in Manawai Basha; an attack on the residence 
of the Governor’s brother in Tahsiniya; an attack on the residence of Hatim Muhsin Hamil 
al-Daraji, the Director of al-Narjis company (a construction company linked to Idani); and 
an attempted assassination against Lt. Col. Adnan Abdul Karim and an IED attack on Lt 
Col. Mustafa Abbas Mohsen (both of whom work for Basra IP Intelligence Directorate). 
Finally, the group was accused of involvement in attacks on logistics convoys contracted 
to the International Coalition. 
While the arrested individuals admitted to involvement in the improbably long list of 
political assassinations and terrorist activity, they were not accused of perpetrating the 
August 2020 assassination campaign in Basra. Nevertheless, PM Kadhimi presented the 
arrests as an important step towards capturing the killers of the Basra activists as well as 
Hisham al-Hashimi who was assassinated in Baghdad. However, behind the theatre of 
their arrest and confessions (including a televised staged re-enactment of the crimes), 
more senior actors in the death squad escaped arrest. This followed a familiar pattern 
whereby well-timed leaks continually frustrated efforts to detain mid-level or senior 
figures involved in these crimes. 
Of note, the death squad leader, Ahmed Abd al-Karim Dhamad (AKA Ahmad al-Tu-
waisa), was able to evade arrest, along with Khalaf Abu Sajjad, Sayid Alaa al-Ghalibi, 
Abbas Haashim, Haider Shinbousa, Ahmad Awda and Bashir al-Wafi. Of these individuals, 
Ahmed Tuwaisa is from Tamimmiya in Basra City, a member of the Bayt Ruwaima tribe 
and formerly a member of the Sadrist Mahdi Army. He later joined several other PMF 
groups, eventually becoming active in KH. Meanwhile, Ahmed Awda is a leader in AAH 
in the Qarmat Ali area of Basra City.38 It was also reported that Ahmed Tuwaisa possesses 
36   Technically illegal in Iraq but actually widespread, so not a definite indication of criminal activity. 
37   An independent ‘think tank’ thought to have ties to the MoI. 
38   Based on interviews conducted by the author, source and other details anonymised. 
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an import licence for Umm Qasr Port. These licences allow the holders to operate as 
so-called istikhraj companies, essentially fixers who coordinate bribes with customs offi-
cials to secure passage of goods through the port. This is amongst the most profitable 
corruption rackets in Iraq, and possession of such a licence would strongly indicate that 
Tuwaisa is extremely wealthy and well connected with the political elite. So long as actors 
like Tuwaisa are able to act with impunity, and can rely on the state and political allies to 
assist them in evading accountability, claims by the PM and his supporters that progress 
is being made on delivering accountability for anti-protest violence will continue to ring 
hollow. 
Conclusion
This paper has presented data on protest violence and its effects on protest tactics and 
strategies in southeast Iraq, showing how this violence – in its diverse forms – has dra-
matically escalated since the summer of 2018. Temporal and geographic distinctions in 
violent dynamics, between different phases of mobilisation and between different prov-
inces in the southeast, as well as between the southeast and the rest of Iraq, have also 
been highlighted. To account for these divergences, the paper has sought to describe the 
multiple, overlapping social logics of protest violence that differentiate violent dynamics 
both within, and between, provinces in southeast Iraq. 
This granular, ground-level view of protest violence adds depth to existing analyses that 
have tended to focus on more general and macro-level forms of explanation that struggle 
to account for divergences in protest dynamics at the local level. Moreover, the data pre-
sented here has also clarified how anti-protest violence, protester-directed violence, and 
protest tactics and strategies more broadly, are constantly shifting and adapting to their 
mutual causal effects.
Ultimately, the social logic of protest violence in Iraq reflects the fact that violence per se 
is organised primarily not within the de jure boundaries of the state, but directly within 
civil society and functions as a regulating principle, more or less explicitly, of virtually all 
political, economic and social relations. Iraqi activists must negotiate with this violence 
not only to formulate viable protest strategies, but merely to survive and avoid liquidation. 
In this negotiation, the Iraqi state qua state is almost entirely absent with its Weberian 
functions having been disaggregated into broader domains of civil society. Here, power 
circulates close to the ground, accessible only to those politico-coercive entities embed-
ded within the local social, political and coercive structures this paper has outlined.39 
Consequently, the policy agenda pursued by western governments in recent years, osten-
sibly seeking to push back the tidal wave of protest-related violence and instability in Iraq, 
rests on a misdiagnosis of power. The focus has been on securing favourable nomina-
tions for Prime Minister, and on strengthening the current Prime Minister and Iraqi state 
39   The Sadrist movement is the example par excellence of this type of locally embedded politico-coer-
cive entity explaining its unrivalled capabilities as a coercive counter-protest actor. 
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institutions to deliver accountability for anti-protest violence. Yet this approach has been 
constrained by the Prime Minister’s lack of a social base, leaving him unable to tap into 
power as it circulates through local structures. Indeed, the political apparatus of the PMO, 
and the PM himself, has, at least to some extent, fallen hostage to the Sadrist movement. 
Consequently, it ought to be questioned whether the policies pursued by the current 
government (e.g., arrests of corrupt officials and militiamen)40 are best understood as 
incremental steps towards reform or, in a more limited sense, as actions permitted by the 
Sadrists insofar as they increase Sadrist comparative advantage vis-à-vis rivals, while ulti-
mately remaining contained by the framework of the Sadrists’ own interests in sustaining 
fairly state-autonomous coercive-economic practices and political violence.
Meanwhile, the continual reshuffling of senior security posts incorrectly perceives coer-
cive power as organised within elite-level state security apparatus. However, it has been 
shown repeatedly that these institutions have little autonomous power over violence 
because control processes41 pertain locally. This is particularly true when contrasting 
ISF-PMF escalations in Baghdad versus more peripheral localities in the south, such as 
Basra, where the prospect of ISF and local political leadership ‘standing their ground’ is 
far more remote.42 Any power wielded by the de jure apparatuses of the state is largely 
a function of the power of the actor working through these institutions and is not con-
ferred by them. Thus, strengthening the Iraqi state under these conditions ought to 
consider the risks of enhancing the coercive tools at the disposal of actors whose real 
sources of power lie elsewhere.43 
40   The work of Abu Ragheef ’s anti-corruption committee. 
41   Staniland, Networks of Rebellion. 
42   This calculation cannot be ignored by central political authority, since even were political and secu-
rity leadership to stand up to the militias in Baghdad (as failed to happen in the Qassim Musleh case), 
the potential escalation by militias in Basra would be even harder for the central government to resist. 
43   The apparent reluctance of the international community to confront this reality, and its eternal search 
for the elusive formula for reform, is plausibly a consequence of their own complicity in the political 
economy of violence that sustains the flow of Iraqi oil to international markets, which prevents a clear-
sighted analysis of power and the Iraqi state from taking hold.
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